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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD - PERMISSIBLE ScoPE OF CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS - The National Labor Relations Board found that the Express Publishing Company had refused to bargain
collectively. Thereupon the board issued an order requiring the company: (I)
to cease and desist refusing to bargain collectively; and (2) to cease and desist
in any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection as guaranteed
in section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. The circuit court of appeals
refused to enforce the latter part of the order, and on writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held that only the portion of the board's order
directing the company to bargain collectiveiy could be enforced. National Labor
Relations Board v. Express Publishing Co., (U.S. 1941) 6r S. Ct. 693, modifying (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) III F. (2d) 588.
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the Labor Board can issue
only those orders required to effectuate the policy of the National Labor Relations Act and permitted by fair inferences from the act's language.1 The present
decision can hardly rest on the broad policy of the act. The statute is preventive
and it could therefore be argued that it would be wise to permit the board to
issue restraining orders covering acts not actually found to be committed.2
Although the circuit court of appeals might experience some difficulty in enforcing such orders in contempt proceedings, precedent for them could be found
in the cases where extremely general and indefinite injunctions have issued
against labor unions. 3 Satisfactory administration of the law demands, however,
that the board, technically trained for the duty, should be the first to determine
whether any particular acts constitute an unfair labor practice. In the principal
case, the board's order, if upheld, would have forced the court to ascertain
originally in summary contempt proceedings whether or not particular practices
were unfair. Since the board is not an equity court, and Congress may consti1
The board was upheld in H.J. Heinz Co. v. N. L. R. B., (U.S. 1941) 61
S. Ct. 320, but was restricted in Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S.
197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938); N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S.
240, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1939); N. L. R. B. v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 59 S. Ct.
508 (1939); and Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 3n U. S. 7, 6r S. Ct. 77
(1940).
2
See 53 HARV. L. REv. 472 (1940). The circuit court ordered the enforcement
of a broad order in N. L. R. B. v. National Motor Bearing Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1939)
105 F. (2d) 652, and in N. L. R. B. v. Pure Oil Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) 103 F.
(2d) 497. An opposite result was reached in Globe Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B.,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 91, and in N. L. R. B. v. Swift & Co., (C. C. A.
7th, 1940) 108 F. (2d) 988.
3
A conviction for contempt under such an injunction was upheld in Schwartz v.
United States, (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) 217 F. 866. See Wrrrn, THE GoVERNMENT IN
LABOR DISPUTES (1932).
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tutionally give it the right to issue orders that could not properly be made by an
equity court, it would appear logical to interpret the Supreme Court's decision as
a construction of the statute outlining the board's power.4 Section 7 briefly
states the rights given labor. 6 Section 8 specifically designates certain actions as
unfair practices. 6 Section IO (a) 7 permits the board to prevent any person from
engaging in "any unfair labor practice" listed in section 8. Section IO (b) 8
provides that if anyone is charged with engaging in any "such" practice, a complaint may issue and a hearing be held. I£ the board finds anyone engaging in
any such practice, it can order the person to "cease and desist from such" performance. The language indicates that the board is to restrain the specific acts
which it finds were unlawfully committed. Only a strained construction permits
the inference that the board may find that one act has been committed, and
thereupon restrain an unrelated act. Perhaps, however, under section 1 o ( e) 9 a
court has the power to enforce either the whole order, including a general restraining clause, or in its discretion, to enforce the order as reasonably modified
to fit the circumstances.10 Justice Douglas' dissent ably argues the necessity of
giving the board sufficiently broad powers so that an employer cannot circumvent
the purposes of the act by continued, difficult-to-prosecute deviations from a
narrow order. But this position is well met by the majority's warning, through
Justice Stone, that an order cannot be evaded by "indirections or formal observances which in fact defy it." 11 On the basis of this decision, an order may
4 Judge Haney stated the position, "Thus it is clear that the Board may order an
employer to cease and desist from 'such' labor practice. By use of the word 'such' the
unfair labor practice is the one previously described, that is the unfair labor practice in
which 'any person in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in.' " Dissent in
N. L. R. B. v. National Motor Bearing Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 652
at 663.
6 49 Stat. L. 452 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 157.
6 49 Stat. L. 452 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 158.
7 49 Stat. L. 453 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 160 (a).
8 49 Stat. L. 453-454 (1935), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 160 (b).
9 49 Stat. L. 454 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 160 (e): "the court
shall have power • . • to make • • • a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so
modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board."
10 This theory might explain those cases where the Supreme Court permitted the
general orders to be enforced without comment. N. L. R. B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co.,·
301 U.S. 49, 57 S. Ct. 642 (1937); Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U.S. 103,
57 S. Ct. 650 (1937); N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333,
58 S. Ct. 904 (1938); Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206
(1938); N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 59 S. Ct. 490
(1939).
11 N. L. R. B. v. Express Publishing Co., (U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 693 at 700:
"The breadth of the order, like the injunction of a court, must depend upon the circumstances of each case, the purpose being to prevent violations, the threat of which
in the future is indicated because of their similarity or relation to those unlawful acts
which the Board has found to have been committed by the employer in the past••••
it is appropriate to add that an order of the Board, like the injunction of a court,
is not to be evaded by indirections or formal observances which in fact defy it. After
an order to bargain collectively in good faith, for example, discriminatory discharge of
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reach out, not only to the unlawful acts actually committed, but to all acts
which are similar to or bear some relation to those unlawful acts.12 The decision
forces the board itself to determine originally whether an unfair practice took
place and permits the courts to restrict their enforcing decrees to specific acts,
already designated as unfair, which are more easily charged and proved in
contempt proceedings. However, the courts can properly give full effect to
Justice Stone's belief that orders should be broad enough to restrain any attempted technical evasions.

Rex B. Martin

union members may so affect the bargaining process as to establish a violation of the
order."
12 N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 862, is an
excellent example.

